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Abstract. As the collateral for the issuance of urban investment bonds (UIBs), land leasing revenue is the fund that is used 
to repay the debt with large-scale land hoarding and increasing land price due to China’s rapid urbanization. This paper 
employs the fixed effect model and panel data from 2006 to 2015 to analyze the influence of land hoarding and price on 
debt scale and risk of local governments. Results reveal that both land hoarding scale and land price exhibit a positive influ-
ence on the UIBs’ scale and risk. However, regional differences are evident. In the Eastern region, the correlation between 
land asset and UIBs can be testified.
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Introduction
After China’s tax-sharing reform between central and lo-
cal governments in 1996, high-quality tax sources are al-
located to the central government, thereby affecting the 
fiscal revenue of local governments (Hu, 1998; Zheng 
et  al., 2014). Under the new tax-sharing system, the lo-
cal governments’ tax resource and revenue were reduced. 
However, the expenditure in local public goods and ser-
vice increased. The imbalance between fiscal revenue and 
expenditure has inevitably increased financial pressure on 
local governments (Wong, 2000; Chen, 2008; Chen & Liu, 
2015; Liu & Zhao, 2011; Tanya et al., 2017). Therefore, lo-
cal governments should find new revenue sources to com-
plete substantial economic development plans and supply 
public goods (Ho & Lin, 2003; Huang & Chan, 2018). The 
emergence of urban land market has encouraged the lo-
cal governments to recognize the value of land resources 
that are controlled and managed by municipal authorities. 
Local governments hold land acquisition and land leasing 
rights and thus use land revenue to stimulate regional eco-
nomic development (Sun & Zhou, 2014; Wu et al., 2015a; 
Xu, 2019; Zhang et al., 2019a).
After the establishment of China’s land bank system in 
2007, local governments have monopolized the construc-
tive land supply in urban region. On the one hand, land 
leasing revenue becomes an important supplement fund 
as a capital for infrastructure projects. On the other hand, 
land assets are guarantees for local government to issue 
urban investment bonds (UIBs). Land prices play a crucial 
role in the UIBs’ repaying process, which affects the local 
governments’ land leasing revenue (Zhang et  al., 2017a; 
Wang & Ye, 2016; Zhang et  al., 2019b). Since 2004, the 
proportion of land leasing revenue in local fiscal revenue 
illustrates a rising trend, with an average annual propor-
tion of more than 30%. Rapid urbanization requires an 
increasing expansion of infrastructure construction. Lo-
cal governments pursue the maximization of land revenue 
to compensate for the fiscal deficit. They are inclined to 
hoard and sell land assets depending on the timing of 
high land price to capture maximum of profit (Cao et al., 
2008). Thus, economic development and rapid urbaniza-
tion are accompanied by large-scale land hoarding and 
soaring land price. In 2015, 76,200 hectares added land 
was hoarded by China’s local governments. Land hoarding 
by local governments could cause land speculation and 
consequently raise land price, which would trigger a real 
estate bubble and social problems (Zheng et al., 2014).
Land assets have become the local governments’ tool 
to obtain revenue and financing leverage for infrastruc-
ture construction (Tsui, 2011). The debt financing mode 
of local governments is popular. Figure 1 indicates that 
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state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are established as local 
financing platforms (LFPs). Land is used as collateral to 
issue UIBs to obtain money from financial system. UIBs 
(chengtouzhai), which are known as “quasi-municipal 
bonds,” are corporate bonds issued publicly by SOEs to 
support local infrastructure construction. The China’s 
Wind Database reports that 2,854 new UIBs were issued 
in 2018, and the total amount of the UIBs has reached 
2 trillion yuan.
Funds obtained by local governments through LFPs are 
mainly used for infrastructure construction and urban land 
development. Thus, SOEs must repay the debts through the 
land leasing revenue. If land prices do not rise, then local 
governments and LFPs would face pressure from repay-
ment and thus results in uncontrollable risks. If local gov-
ernments take immense land as mortgage to obtain funds 
and the land market enters depression period, then bond 
risk would rapidly increase. In the financial system, default 
risks increase when government-invested infrastructure 
projects are not profitable and exhibit poor solvency. The 
debt risk of UIBs rapidly changes the bank system and lo-
cal governments, thereby damaging social economy and the 
urban sustainable development (Pan et al., 2017).
Local governments use land assets to pay back the 
UIBs and counteract debt risk. UIBs aim to invest in 
urban infrastructure projects, which are closely related 
to land value. This study analyzes the influence of land 
hoarding area and land prices on local debt risk among 31 
provinces, from 2006 to 2015. Compared with existing lit-
erature, the main contributions of this study are as follows. 
First, in addition to socio-economic, demographic, finan-
cial and political factors, this paper analyzes the impact of 
land assets on local debt scale and risk. The new frame-
work is proposed for the analysis of local debt influencing 
factors. Second, the influence of local governments’ land 
speculation on local debt risk is verified. When hoarding a 
lot of land, local governments tend to issue more urban in-
vestment bonds. And the risk of urban investment bonds 
also increases. It benefits local governments to adjust 
management policies, take preventive action, and avoid 
debt crisis. Third, the regional difference of land hoarding 
and land price on debt risk are tested. Land speculation 
of local governments has different effects on the scale and 
risk of urban investment bonds in different regions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
The first section reviews the literature. The second section 
introduces the data variables and empirical models. The 
third section reports and discusses the empirical results 
and regional heterogeneity. The final section presents the 
conclusion.
1. Literature review
Since the Second World War, urbanization has played a 
key role in promoting economic development and so-
cial change, while most developing countries have been 
promoting urbanization (Bloom et al., 2008; Long et al., 
2012). China has also experienced unprecedented ur-
banization since the late 1970s. The urban population in 
China has increased from 172 million in 1978 to 830 mil-
lion in 2018. Thus, China’s urbanization rate has increased 
by approximately 1% every year, from 17.92% in 1978 to 
59.58% in 2018. Socioeconomic development demands 
infrastructure construction, such as highways, subways, 
schools, and hospitals, to maintain the normal operation 
and development of cities (Harvey, 1978). However, infra-
structure construction and operation are expensive and 
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Figure 1. China’s UIBs issuance and repayment process
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Local governments need to seek for additional revenues 
to maintain the balance of local finances. The competition 
pressure pushes local governments to land finance (tudi 
caizheng) (Lin & Yi, 2011; Wu et  al., 2015b; Xu, 2019). 
Land assets are effective collateral for local governments 
to raise funds for achieving ambitious urbanization goals 
(Wang et al., 2018; Tu & Padovani, 2018). Land develop-
ment and leasing revenue are the means to generate fiscal 
revenue and promote economic growth. Such strategy has 
greatly contributed to industrialization and urbanization 
(Wu et al., 2016b; Bao & Peng, 2016; Liu et al., 2016).
In China’s land bank system, land leasing revenue, 
land-related tax, and land mortgage are taken as “land fi-
nance” (Wang et al., 2018; Gao, 2019). On the one hand, 
China’s land ownership is divided into urban state-owned 
and rural collective-owned land. Local governments have 
the right to requisition rural collective land at low prices 
for urban development. The local governments lease land 
use rights to commencers through bidding, auction, and 
listing. The land leasing revenue is used to invest in new 
infrastructure projects (Cheng et al., 2018). On the other 
hand, to satisfy fiscal debt, local governments establish 
LFPs to obtain loans from commercial banks and inves-
tors (Lu & Sun, 2013; Pan et  al., 2017). UIBs exceeded 
bank loans and became the main financial resources of 
local governments, and LFPs’ bonds accounted for the 
largest share in investment (Tsui, 2011). UIBs become the 
main source of local urban construction funds, and land 
is the main asset of LFPs’ collateral for bonds (Wang & 
Hui, 2017).
Land speculation and the immense hoarding of land 
assets for large-scale borrowing occur. The scarcity and 
non-renewability of land lead to the inelasticity of sup-
ply, which makes speculation easy. Land speculation is a 
widespread economic phenomenon in urbanization, in 
which speculators strategically hoard land in advance to 
obtain high future profits. Given the prosperity, recession, 
and depression in the economic cycle, a wide range of 
land speculation has been prevalent worldwide (Hyman 
& Markowski, 1980; Tewfik, 1989). Land speculation ac-
tivities objectively support the urban development process 
and maintain economic vitality (Rancich, 1970; Firman, 
2000). Some studies have proved that land speculation 
is a factor for real estate price volatility and assets’ bub-
ble. Land speculation is consistently accompanied by land 
hoarding, which directly affects land supply (Goodman & 
Thibodeau, 2008).
Neutze (1970) documented that land speculation strat-
egy aims to hoard undeveloped, potential, and readily trad-
able land to obtain high profits. However, the instability of 
the land value generates unpaid risk to UIBs. As the main 
driving force, land finance has promoted land-centered ur-
banization to compel China’s economic development, but 
the practice exhibited negative impact on social develop-
ment, such as housing poverty, real estate price bubble, and 
debt risk (Feng et al., 2019). If land prices constantly rise, 
then local governments can obtain loans or issue UIBs to 
support their development plans (Wu et al., 2015a). How-
ever, potential depression on the land market may impair 
the solvency of local governments.
In 2010, The China State Council issued a policy to 
strengthen the management of LFPs and the supervision 
of LFPs bond risk. The reduction of land leasing revenue 
threatens local governments’ repayment and endangers 
China’s bank system (Peng, 2011). The downturn of land 
and real estate market can potentially trigger a local debt 
crisis (Wu et al., 2016a; Cao et al., 2014). In China’s rapid 
urbanization, the debt risk of local governments is per-
ceived to be on the verge of collapse (Wu et al., 2017; Geng 
et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018). Although 
China’s land bank system has provided substantial funds 
to support infrastructure construction in past decades, the 
risk and unsustainability yield serious financial and debt 
crisis that could endanger social stability and disrupt fu-
ture development (Cai et al., 2019).
Some studies find that socio-economic, demographic, 
fiscal, land finance, and political indicators have impact on 
local government debt. The higher the unemployment rate 
is, the higher the debt will be (Liu et al., 2017; Faulk & Kil-
lian, 2016). The wage has a negative impact on local debt 
and GDP per capita is a negative impact on the debt risk 
(Veiga & Veiga, 2014; Cooray et al., 2017). Population size 
and population density have a positive impact on local 
debt (Faulk & Killian, 2016). The demographic structure, 
such as the proportion of the 65-year-old population in 
the total population, has different effects on debt in dif-
ferent regions (Bellot et al., 2017).
The balance of local revenue and expenditure and the 
ratio of public budget to GDP have a negative impact on 
the debt risk. Fiscal concentration has a negative impact 
on local government debt scale (Galiński, 2016; Liu et al., 
2017). Based on land finance, the influence of proportion 
of urban land use on debt scale is negative. The amount of 
land leasing revenue is positively correlated with the debt 
scale. The countries with higher levels of public corrup-
tion have higher local debt scale. Competition between 
local governments in infrastructure and economic devel-
opment will increase debt scale (Liu et al., 2017; Cooray 
et al., 2017; Pan et al., 2017).
Land finance and debt risk is a popular issue in China’s 
rapid urban development, which is affected by many fac-
tors. This study attempts to explore the relationship be-
tween land leasing and governments’ debt risks in China’s 
land marketization.
2. Data, variables, and methods
2.1. Research area and data source
This study analyzes the UIBs, land market, and economic 
development of 31 provinces from 2006 to 2015. Data of 
the GDP, per capita GDP, local fiscal revenue, fixed asset 
investment, secondary and tertiary industry added value, 
and employment growth were obtained from The China 
Statistical Yearbooks (2006–2015). Provincial land bidding, 
auction and listing, approval quotas of residential land, 
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residential land purchase area, and land price were ob-
tained from The China Land and Resources Statistical Year-
books (2006–2015). The land price and per capita GDP, as 
well as the local financial revenue and transaction price 
are measured in Chinese yuan, and the unit of land area 
is hectare.
UIBs data are from the China’s WIND Data Bank. To 
improve the data accuracy, this study analyzed the bond 
data of LFPs. Moreover, 2,419 LFPs from 2006 to 2017 were 
obtained, and 13,926 UIBs data were collected. The unit of 
UIBs is 100 million Chinese yuan. To eliminate the effect 
of inflation and reflect the actual change of variables with 
2006 as the research base year, the data of money value 
variables from 2006 to 2015 were reduced to 2006 accord-
ing to the corresponding index, and the index data sources 
are from the 2006–2015 China Statistical Yearbooks.
2.2. Descriptive statistics and definitions of the 
variables
Owing to unavailability of data, existing research about 
UIBs used qualitative analysis (Tsui, 2011). This paper se-
lected UIBs scale and risk as the explained variables and 
tested the land hoarding area and residential land price ef-
fect. The data of the secondary and tertiary industry added 
value, fixed asset investment, employment growth, per 
capita GDP, and land financial dependence, government 
intervention, and the degree of land marketization that 
affected local government’s land behavior were the control 
variables. Table 1 indicates the quantitative methods and 
descriptive statistics of each variable.
Urban investment bonds (UIBonds) are also known 
as “quasi municipal bonds,” which are issued by SOEs. 
UIBs are corporate bonds for local infrastructure con-
struction or public welfare projects. The size of UIBs is 
the dependent variable in the study.
Debt risk (DRisk): Fan and Lv (2012) used the debt 
ratio (total debt / GDP) as a risk measurement indica-
tor, and believed that debt ratio remains below 50% was 
manageable. Ma (2013) provided the viewpoint that the 
proportion of debt scale to GDP is close to 60%, which 
was regarded as a risk warning line. Based on previous 
literature, we use the ratio of the UIBs’ scale and GDP to 
express the debt risk and measure the bearing capacity of 
the local economy’s total scale to local debt. The larger the 
value is, the higher the governments’ fiscal risk will be.
According to Baldacci et al. (2011), the debt risk index 
is constructed, which is expressed as follows. Debt risk 
is measured by the ratio of the total amount of UIBs of 
provincial region every year, GDP is the annual GDP of 
the region, gd represents the growth rate of local UIBs, gg 
represents the growth rate of nominal GDP, and t is the 
observed year.
( ) ( ) 1 / 1 .t td gDRisk UIBonds g gdp g= + +  (1)
Land hoarding area (LHArea): According to Du and 
Peiser (2014), land hoarding area can reflect land specula-
tion by local governments. Land hoarding area is an in-
dicator of the hoarded land size and is determined by us-
ing the difference between the approved quota and actual 
trading volume. The potential land supply is measured by 
the indicator of approved quota from the central govern-
ment. Actual land trading volume by the developers is 
regarded as the actual land selling amount. The former 
minus the latter generates the current scale of local gov-
ernment land hoarding.
Land price (LPrice): According to Pan et al. (2017), 
the land leasing revenue of local governments has a posi-
tive impact on the debt scale. The land price of each prov-
ince is obtained by dividing the land transaction amount 
by land trading area, which was purchased by developers. 
Local governments sell land use rights in the form of ten-
dering, auction, and listing.
Land hoarding value (LHValue): This variable is an 
interactive term between the land hoarding area and land 
price, which reflects the value of the land hoarded by local 
governments. Land hoarding value is obtained by multi-
plying the land hoarding area by the land price.
Secondary and tertiary industry added value (Gstgdp): 
Fiscal revenue and regional economic vitality will affect the 
issuance of UIBs (Pan et al., 2017). This variable reflects the 
economic vitality of one year. The service industry value in-
dicates urban economic growth. Therefore, urban economic 
growth can indirectly reflect the expectation of developers 
who purchase land and the motivation of the governments 
that hoard land. The annual output value of the industrial 
and service industries can be obtained from the China Sta-
tistical Yearbooks.
Fixed asset investment (FAInvest): According to Wu 
et  al. (2016a), holding Mega-events will promote local 
governments to increase urban sports facilities and infra-
structure construction, leading to an increase in fixed asset 
investment, thereby exacerbating local government debt. 
This variable includes capital construction, renovation, ma-
jor repairs, and other fixed asset investments. The annual 
statistics of urban fixed assets investment in each province 
can be obtained from the China Statistical Yearbooks.
Employment growth (EGrowth): Employment situ-
ation can have a certain impact on debt issuance. The 
higher the unemployment rate is, the higher the debt scale 
will be. This paper uses employment growth to reflect the 
employment situation (Liu et  al., 2017; Faulk & Killian, 
2016). Employment growth is the number of employed 
people in the current year minus the employed population 
in the previous year.
Per capita GDP (PCgdp): According to Coolay et al. 
(2017), GDP per capita has a negative impact on the debt 
risk. This variable reflects the level of regional economic 
development and indirectly affects the scale of UIBs. Local 
governments need supply for the infrastructure projects. 
The annual per capita GDP of each province in China can 
be obtained using the China Statistical Yearbooks.
Land finance dependence (LFDepend): Land finance 
has become the main revenue of local government. There-
fore, land financial dependence may affect land leasing be-
havior and the scale of bonds issued by local government. 
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Land financial dependence is the ratio between the land 
leasing revenue and the total local government’s revenue 
in the current year.
Government intervention on land market (GIn-
terven): The supply of state-owned construction land is 
mainly derived through allocation, transfer, lease, and 
other land supply methods. Allocated land is state-owned 
land use right acquired gratis after government approval 
according to law. Government regulation on the land mar-
ket can affect house prices and land prices. Under China’s 
land bank system, land supply is a powerful tool that 
could intervene urban development. The proportion of 
allocated land indicates the government’s intervention in 
the land market. The administrative allocation/transfer of 
land area reflects the direct intervention of local govern-
ments in land transfer.
Degree of land marketization (DLMarket): This vari-
able refers to the area allocated by the government to the 
transfer scale reflecting the relative degree of liberaliza-
tion of the regional land market. A high indicator value 
indicates a low degree of land marketization in the region. 
The high degree of land marketization indicates highly 
competitive urban land market. This paper measured the 
degree of land marketization by the proportion of the 
contracted transferred area in the supply of state-owned 
construction land to the total transferred land area (Wen 
et al., 2018; Wang & Hui, 2017; Hu & Qian, 2017; Zhang 
et al., 2017b).
2.3. Models and hypotheses
The mixed-, random-, and fixed-effect models are the 
three types of panel data models. The null hypothesis of 
the F test supports the mixed-effects model. The alterna-
tive hypothesis supports the fixed-effects model. Table 2 
reflects the test results of the F statistics. Based on the F 
statistics of UIBonds and DRisk models, the P value is 
0.000. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% 
significance level, and the fixed-effect model is supported.
Hausman test was used to select between the ran-
dom- and the fixed-effect model. The null hypothesis 
of Hausman test posits that the random-effect model is 
best among the aforementioned models. The alternative 
hypothesis states that the fixed effect is the best model 
among the aforementioned models. If χ2 value is greater 
than the critical value, then the null hypothesis is rejected.
Table 3 reveals that the P values of the Hausman test in 
UIBonds and DRisk models are likewise 0.000. Thus, the 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables
Type Variable Unit of measure Mean Middle Max Min Std. Error
Explained 
variables
UIBonds (Total UIBs) Hundred million Chinese dollar 166.900 62.850 2860.000 0.000 291.600
DRisk (Debt scale risk) Percentage 37.910 19.490 325.000 0.000 48.020
Explanatory 
variables
LHArea idle (Land hoarding 
area)
Ten thousand 
square meter 1133.000 706.300 7358.000 –3220.000 1479.000
LPrice (Land price level) Chinese dollar 2328.000 1613.000 25665.000 0.000 2814.000
LHValue (Land hoarding value) Million Chinese dollar 2.700 1.200 1.900 –5.700 3.980
Gstgdp (Second and third 
industry added value)
Hundred million 
Chinese dollar 14036.000 11000.000 69467.000 239.900 12920.000
FAInvest (Fixed asset 
investment)
Hundred million 
Chinese dollar 9358.000 6960.000 47382.000 200.700 8438.000
EGrowth (Employment growth) Ten thousand person 21.030 8.000 672.400 –53.800 61.090
PCgdp (Per capita GDP) Chinese dollar 36406.000 32000.000 107960.000 5932.000 21565.000
LFDepend (Land financial 
dependence) Percentage 0.461 0.430 1.400 0.000 0.239
GInterven (Government 
intervention on land market) Percentage 0.243 0.120 1.840 0.000 0.269
DLMarket (Degree of land 
marketization) Percentage 0.974 0.670 7.590 0.080 1.048
Notes: The data is derived from the China Statistical Yearbooks (2006–2015); Provincial land bidding, auction and listing, approval of residential land 
area, residential land purchase area, and transaction price are derived from the China Land and Resources Statistical Yearbooks (2006–2015).
Table 2. F test of mixed- and fixed-effect models
Model UIBonds model DRisk model
F statistics 5.790 5.360
P-value 0.000 0.000
Note: Total UIBs are the dependent variables in the UIBonds model and 
the debt scale risk is the dependent variable in the DRisk model.
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null hypothesis is rejected at the significance level of 1%. 
The test results indicated that the panel fixed-effect model 
should be used for estimation.
Based on F and Hausman tests, the double fixed ef-
fect model is adopted to examine the influence of land 
hoarding and land price on UIBs’ scale and risk. Formula 
2 presents the empirical model.
0 1 , 1 2 , 1
3 , 1 ,
it i t i t
i t it i t it
y LHArea LPrice
LHValue x u u
− −
−
= β +β +β +
β +β + + + ε
 (2)
where: yit is UIBs’ scale (UIBonds) and UIBs’ risk (DRisk) 
of i province in t year; , 1 i tLHArea −  is the residential land 
hoarding area of i province in t–1 year; , 1  i tLPrice − is land 
price level for residential land of i province in year t–1;
, 1 i tLHValue −  is the total value of hoarding land of i prov-
ince in year t–1; xit is a set of socioeconomic variables 
that affect issuance of UIBs, including level of economic 
development (per capita GDP), employment growth, land 
financial dependence, government intervention, and the 
degree of land marketization; ui is the fixed effect of re-
gions; ut is the time effect;  itε  is the random error term. 
This paper attempts to test the influence of the scale of 
land hoarding, price level, and land value on the scale and 
risk of UIBs. Three hypotheses are presented below.
Hypothesis 1: The land hoarding scale by local gov-
ernments exhibits a positive influence on UIBs’ scale 
and risk. The large hoarded land size highly guarantees 
that local governments can repay their debts.
Hypothesis 2: Land price exhibits a positive influ-
ence on UIBs’ scale and risk. High land price in t–1 term 
increases the debt that local governments will issue. Thus, 
the risk of local debt increases.
Hypothesis 3: Regional difference exists in the rela-
tionship between land hoarding scale, land price and 
UIBs scale and risk. Comparing to the Central and West-
ern regions, the economic vitality of the Eastern region is 
strong and the land market price is relatively high. There-
fore, it is expected that the land price is likely to rise, lead-
ing to land speculation in the Eastern region, and local 
governments are more inclined to issue UIBs.
3. Results
3.1. Empirical results
Before empirical work, some tests about the data, such as 
Hausman test, Variance Inflation Factor test, and Levin-
Lin-Chu test, are done to ensure the reliability of the re-
sults. The fixed-effect model is selected to examine the 
three hypotheses with the 31 provincial-level panel data 
from 2006 to 2015. Table 4 shows the results of the UIBo-
nds scale models.
In model 4, the adjustment R2 is 0.735. Thus, 73.5% of 
the changes can be explained by the explanatory variables 
selected. Furthermore, the model’s explanatory power is 
strong. The residential land hoarding area is positive on 
the debt scale of local governments. Table 4 shows that the 
residential land hoarding area is positive on UIBs’ scale 
and statistically significant at the 10% level of significance, 
with a coefficient value of 0.237. The increase of residential 
land hoarding by local governments increases the issuance 
of UIBs’ scale. The land price is also positive on UIBs’ risk 
and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance, 
with a coefficient value of 0.281. So, the land asset and its 
price can impact the UIBonds’ scale.
Table  5 reflects the DRisk models’ results. Evidently, 
risk is the explanatory variable. In model 8, the adjust-
ment R2 of the models is 0.736, which indicates that 73.6% 
of the changes can be explained by the explanatory and 
Table 3. Hausman test of random effects and fixed effect models
Model UIBonds model DRisk model
χ2 31.050 43.580
P-value 0.000 0.000
Note: Total UIBs are the dependent variables in the UIBonds model and 
debt scale risk is the dependent variable in the DRisk Model.
Table 4. Estimation results about UIBs’ scale models







Gstgdp 0.686* 0.587 0.679* 0.574
(1.680) (1.420) (1.660) (1.380)
FAInvest 1.290*** 1.388*** 1.337*** 1.247***
(3.320) (3.710) (3.46)0 (3.180)
EGrowth –0.000 0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(–0.010) (0.020) (–0.010) (–0.070)
PCgdp –1.398* –1.391* –1.367* –1.579**
(–1.880) (–1.860) (–1.840) (–2.090)
LFDepend 0.180*** 0.147*** 0.171*** 0.205***
(2.490) (2.400) (2.470) (2.560)
GInterven 0.249 0.288 0.249 0.286
(0.510) (0.590) (0.510) (0.580)
DLMarket –0.157 –0.157 –0.156 –0.148
(–1.180) (–1.170) (–1.170) (–1.100)
Constant –0.742*** –2.149*** –1.307*** 0.476***
(–2.110) (–2.310) (–2.190) (2.070)
Province effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 310 309 310 309
Adj. R2 0.737 0.734 0.736 0.735
F 36.654 36.485 36.532 32.949
Notes: ***, **, and * denote variables that are statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. The values of t 
are enclosed in parentheses.
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3.2. Regional difference
In China, significant differences are noticeable in the eco-
nomic development among different regions. This regional 
difference affects the UIBs’ scale and risk. To investigate 
this difference, the samples were divided into Eastern and 
Central and Western regions for analysis. According to the 
criteria of the China National Bureau of Statistics, the East-
ern region comprised 10 provincial-level regions, including 
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhe-
jiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan. The Central and 
Western regions consisted of 21 provincial-level regions, 
including Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Anhui, Ji-
angxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, 
Gansu, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Chongqing, 
Ningxia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Xizang.
In Table  6, the results present that the influence of 
land hoarding is positive and statistically significant at 
control variables. The influence of residential land hoard-
ing area on the UIBs’ risk is 0.043, which is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Hence, the increase 
of residential land hoarding would encourage an increase 
in UIBs’ risk. The land price is also positive on UIBs’ risk 
and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance, 
with a coefficient, 0.023. So, the land asset’s price can im-
pact the debt risk.
Tables 4 and 5 reveal that the influence of land hoard-
ing scale, land price on the UIBs’ scale and risk is posi-
tive and statistically significant. Therefore, the increase 
in scale and price increases the issuance scale of UIBs, 
thereby rising UIBs’ risk. Therefore, when the land price 
of residential land rises, the risk of UIBs also increases. 
Thus, the land price rise enhances the local government’s 
ability to finance land assets. Infrastructure construction 
needs a considerable amount of funds. The investment in 
fixed assets and the development of secondary and tertiary 
industries are intensified. Hence, local governments have 
increased motivation to issue bonds to fulfill the financing 
needs brought by economic development.
Table 5. Estimation results about UIBs’ risk models







Gstgdp 2.178* 2.136* 2.161* 0.000
(1.710) (1.650) (1.700) (0.520)
FAInvest 2.324* 2.514** 2.422** 0.032***
(1.920) (2.150) (2.010) (5.780)
EGrowth 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.009
(0.300) (0.270) (0.290) (1.460)
PCgdp –3.682** –3.612** –3.631** –0.018**
(–2.590) (–2.550) (–2.570) (–2.520)
LFDepend –0.187 –0.194 –0.199 2.307
(–0.160) (–0.170) (–0.180) (0.420)
GInterven 0.099 0.092 0.098 2.648
(0.070) (0.060) (0.060) (0.640)
DLMarket –0.194** –0.174*** –0.188*** –4.186***
(–2.470) (–3.420) (–3.450) (–3.430)
Constant 4.898*** 3.319** 3.866** 22.588**
(2.230) (2.150) (2.180) (2.010)
Province effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 310 310 310 310
Adj. R2 0.677 0.677 0.678 0.736
F 12.335 12.258 12.313 10.998
Notes: ***, **, and * denote variables that are statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. The values of t 
are enclosed in parentheses.
Table 6. Estimation results of Eastern and Central and  
Western regions
Variable









LHArea 0.380* 1.026** 0.219 0.327
(1.920) (2.330) (1.040) (0.470)
LPrice 0.411** 0.212* 0.102 0.092
(1.690) (1.13) (0.300) (0.07)
LHValue –0.135 –0.288 –0.102 –0.175
(–1.43) (–1.53) (–0.91) (–0.49)
Gstgdp 0.020*** 2.811*** 1.089*** 2.833***
(2.020) (2.960) (2.200) (2.770)
FAInvest 3.152 5.142 0.802 1.024
(1.800) (0.950) (1.380) (0.670)
EGrowth 0.001 0.010 –0.001 0.005
(0.160) (0.790) (–0.10) (0.260)
PCgdp –6.135** –17.419*** 0.431 –1.217
(–2.79) (–3.69) (0.270) (–0.22)
LFDepend 0.366** 0.524* –0.380** –0.998*
(1.400) (1.210) (–1.68) (–1.56)
GInterven 0.309 –1.317 0.582 0.901
(0.410) (–0.45) (0.610) (0.280)
DLMarket –0.659** –0.418** –0.091** –0.036**
(–2.170) (–2.220) (–2.710) (–2.090)
Constant 35.615*** 117.346** –18.164*** –13.215***
(3.640) (2.630) (–3.300) (–3.270)
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 110 110 199 199
Adj. R2 0.674 0.359 0.758 0.569
F – – 265.949 202.256
Notes: ***, **, and * denote variables that are statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. The values of t 
are enclosed in parentheses.
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the significance level of 10% and 5% in the Eastern re-
gion. The coefficient is 0.38 and 1.026. Therefore, the UIBs 
scale and risk will continue to expand given the expansion 
of land hoarding scale. In addition, the influence of land 
price on UIBs’ risk is positive and statistically significant 
at the different significance levels. The coefficient value is 
0.411 and 0.212. Therefore, the UIBs’ risk of local gov-
ernments would continue to expand given rising in land 
price. However, the estimation results of samples from the 
Central and Western regions show no statistically signifi-
cant relationship among land hoarding scale and price, 
hoarding land value on UIBs’ scale, and risk.
Discussion and conclusion
Results discussion
Using the regional economic data among China’s 31 pro-
vincial-level regions from 2005 to 2016, this paper em-
ployed fixed-effect models to test the UIBs’ scale and risk 
and their influence factors. This study focuses on the land 
hoarding scale and land price’s effect, which is controlled 
by local governments in China.
Hypothesis 1 is verified. The land hoarding area by lo-
cal government has positive influence on the UIBs’ risk. 
Hence, funds for local debt repayment are obtained from 
land leasing revenue and land tax income. When local 
governments have sufficient land assets, their repayment 
ability is strong in the future. The guarantees, namely land 
assets, can be used to repay debts. However, UIBs are hid-
den debts for local governments, and the debt repayment 
relies on land revenue. The debt repayment sources are 
based on the expectation of rising land prices. If the land 
price falls, it will be difficult for the LFPs to repay, and the 
debt risk will be transferred to the local government. The 
local government must use other resources to repay.
Hypothesis 2 is proven. The residential land price ex-
hibits positive influence on UIBs’ risk. This is similar to 
the results of Pan et al. (2017). High land sale price in the 
term t–1 indicates high expectation from the local govern-
ment on the income from land leasing. Therefore, land 
revenue increases stability. Local governments are likely to 
issue bonds. But land asset is an important source of local 
government. Due to the limited and non-renewable nature 
of land resources, urban development supported by land 
finance is unsustainable. Local governments need to seek 
new sources of funding to promote urban development.
Hypothesis 3 is also verified. The relationship between 
land assets and UIBs is positive in the Eastern region. 
However, this close relationship is unapparent in the 
Central and Western regions. The economic vitality of the 
Eastern region is higher, and the economic development 
level and the land market price are relatively higher than 
other two regions. In Table 6, the results present that the 
influence of secondary and tertiary industry added value 
is positive in the Eastern and the Central and Western 
regions. Pan et al. (2017) research also shows that regional 
economic performance positively affects the local govern-
ments’ tendency to issue debt. In our results, land hoard-
ing and land prices have no significant impact on the scale 
and risks of UIBs in the Central and Western regions, 
which may be due to the lower financing pressure caused 
by urban infrastructure construction than the Eastern re-
gions. The level of economic development and land prices 
are relatively low, and expected land prices are less likely 
to rise in the Central and Western regions.
In addition, the empirical results show that local gov-
ernment fixed asset investment has a positive impact on the 
issuance scale and risk of UIBs, which confirms Wu et al. 
(2016a) results. The increase of urban fixed asset invest-
ment, as the major driving force for economic growth, leads 
to the increase of financing demand, which will lead to the 
aggravation of local government debt. Local governments 
can avoid issuing more bonds by broadening the financ-
ing channels for infrastructure construction. The paper also 
concludes that the per capita GDP of local government has 
a negative impact on the issuance scale and risk of UIBs, 
which is the same as the results of Cooray et al. (2017).
Research conclusion
After China’s tax-sharing reform, local governments face 
financial pressure in rapid urbanization and therefore 
need financial sources to support urban infrastructure 
construction. After the establishment of the land bank 
system, the urban land supply has been monopolized by 
local governments. The local governments initially aim to 
pursue the maximization of land leasing revenue on the 
land market to support rapid urban development. Land 
finance is the popular means for local governments that 
rely heavily on land for mortgage loans. The UIBs allow 
local governments to loan money from bank system and 
investors. The holding land value directly affects UIBs’ 
risk. To maximize land revenue, local governments would 
prefer to hoard land and lease the land at a high price to 
capture the land value.
Our research found that local government’s land specu-
lation has a certain impact on the scale and risk of UIBs 
issuance. Empirical results show that when the land hoard-
ing scale increases, land assets are added for mortgage and 
repayment. The local governments have increased confi-
dence to issue bonds by LFPs, particularly in the developed 
regions. In the Eastern region, the pressure of maintaining 
economic growth and public good demand is high. An in-
crease in the UIBs’ scale will increase UIBs’ risk. Although 
land finance can provide financial support for infrastruc-
ture construction, UIBs debt repayment pressure will yield 
huge costs and risks. The results are that local government’s 
land speculation has a certain impact on the scale and risk 
of UIBs. The fluctuation of land value leads to uncertainty 
of debt repayment. When the LFPs cannot repay the bonds, 
the debt risk will be transferred to local governments, in-
creasing the financial pressure of local governments. In re-
cent years, the UIBs have been growing rapidly, and there 
are certain fiscal and financial risks, which are harmful to 
urban sustainable development.
International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 25(1): 65–75 73
Thus, risk assessment and warning mechanisms should 
be established. Moreover, the value assessment and related 
processes of land mortgage loans should be regulated, and 
local government bank financial risks should be prevented. 
It is unsustainable to keep the urban rapid development 
supported by land finance. Local governments need to 
broaden financing channels and innovate ways to promote 
urban development. This research focuses on local gov-
ernments’ land speculation, analyzes the influence factors 
of local governments’ UIBs scale and risk, and provides 
a new theoretical framework for related research. How-
ever, there are some limitations. The provincial panel data 
is selected as the research unit. Actually, the debt repay-
ment pressure of the prefecture-level cities in the Eastern 
region is greater than that of provincial governments. So 
the influence of land assets on prefecture-level municipal 
governments’ debt can be studied in the future.
Policy discussion
Based on the conclusion, there are some proposals for 
debt risk management. Firstly, the unbalance between fis-
cal revenue and expenditure in China’s tax-sharing system 
should be changed, which pushes the local governments 
turn to land finance for urban development. The fiscal and 
taxation system should be reformed to clarify the rights 
and responsibilities of the Central and local governments. 
Some policies should be issued to promote the match be-
tween financial resources and expenditure. Secondly, the 
behaviors of LFPs should be regulated in order to reduce 
debt risks. It is helpful to clarify the LFPs’ repayment, 
guarantee and rescue responsibilities. It is a long time that 
UIBs play a major role in China’s infrastructure construc-
tion. But, with less land available for leasing, the unsus-
tainability of the mode is obvious. Therefore, the situation 
that urban construction relies too much on UIBs should 
be changed. For large-scale public infrastructure construc-
tion projects, the Public-Private Partnership model (PPP) 
can be adopted to encourage enterprises and private capi-
tal to participate in infrastructure construction. Thirdly, 
the monitoring system for local governments’ debt risk 
should be established, and the warning line of debt risk 
should be set up according to local socioeconomic condi-
tion.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by National Social Science 
Fund of China (16BJL053), Zhejiang Provincial Natu-
ral Science Foundation (LY18G030039, LY17G030008, 
LQ18G010008), and National Natural Science Foundation 
of China (71974169).
Conflict of interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Baldacci, E., Gupta, S., & Mati, A. (2011). Political and fiscal 
risk determinants of sovereign spreads in emerging markets. 
Review of Development Economics, 15(2), 251–263. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00606.x
Bao,  H.  J., & Peng, Y. (2016). Effect of land expropriation on 
land-lost farmers’ entrepreneurial action: a case study of Zhe-
jiang Province. Habitat International, 53, 342–349. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.12.008
Bellot, N. J., Selva, M. L. M., & Menéndez, L. G. (2017). Determi-
nants of sub-central European government debt. The Spanish 
Review of Financial Economics, 15(2), 52–62. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.srfe.2017.04.001
Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., & Fink, G. (2008). Urbanization and 
the wealth of nations. Science, 319(5864), 772–775. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1153057
Cai, Z. Y., Liu, Z. X., Zuo, S. M., & Cao, S. X. (2019). Finding 
a peaceful road to urbanization in China. Land Use Policy, 
83, 560–563. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.02.042
Cao, G., Feng, C., & Tao, R. (2008). Local ‘land finance’ in 
China’s urban expansion: challenges and solutions. China & 
World Economy, 16(2), 19–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-124X.2008.00104.x
Cao, S., Lv, Y., Zheng, H., & Wang, X. (2014). Challenges facing 
China’s unbalanced urbanization strategy. Land Use Policy, 
39, 412–415. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2013.12.004
Chen, A. (2008). The 1994 tax reform and its impact on China’s 
rural fiscal structure. Modern China, 34(3), 303–343. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0097700408315987
Chen, B. J., & Liu, Y. P. (2015). Local government debt risk early 
warning algorithm based on fuzzy analysis. In 2015 Sixth In-
ternational Conference on Intelligent Systems Design and En-
gineering Applications (pp. 494–499). IEEE.
https://doi.org/10.1109/ISDEA.2015.129
Cheng, S., Xie, H. L., Jiang, J. F., & Chen, Q. R. (2018). Is urban 
land development driven by economic development or fis-
cal revenue stimuli in China? Land Use Policy, 77, 107–115. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.05.031
Cooray, A., Dzhumashev, R., & Schneider, F. (2017). How does 
corruption affect public debt? An empirical analysis. World 
Development, 90, 115–127. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.020
Du, J., & Peiser,  R.  B. (2014). Land supply, pricing and local 
governments’ land hoarding in China. Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, 48, 180–189. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.07.002
Fan, G., & Lv, Y. (2012). Fiscal prudence and growth sustainabil-
ity: an analysis of China’s public debts. Asian Economic Policy 
Review, 7(2), 202–220. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-3131.2012.01234.x
Faulk, D., & Killian, L. (2016). Special districts and local govern-
ment debt: an analysis of “Old Northwest Territory” states. 
Public Budgeting & Finance, 37(1), 112–134. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12122
Feng, W. L., Liu, Y. S., & Qu, L. L. (2019). Effect of land-centered 
urbanization on rural development: a regional analysis in 
China. Land Use Policy, 87, 104072. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.104072
Firman, T. (2000). Rural to urban land conversion in Indonesia 
during boom and bust periods. Land Use Policy, 17(1), 13–20. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0264-8377(99)00037-X
74 J. Zhang et al. Land assets, urban investment bonds, and local governments’ debt risk, China
Galiński, P. (2016). Determinants of debt limits in local govern-
ments: case of Poland. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Scienc-
es, 213, 376–382. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.11.554
Gao, H. N. (2019). Public land leasing, public productive spend-
ing and economic growth in Chinese cities. Land Use Policy, 
88, 104076. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.104076
Geng, B., Zhang, X., Liang, Y., Bao, H., & Skitmore, M. (2018). 
Sustainable land finance in a new urbanization context: theo-
retical connotations, empirical tests and policy recommenda-
tions. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 128, 336–344. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2016.11.013
Goodman, A. C., & Thibodeau, T. G. (2008). Where are the specula-
tive bubbles in US housing markets? Journal of Housing Econom-
ics, 17(2), 117–137. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2007.12.001
Harvey, D. (1978). The urban process under capitalism: a frame-
work for analysis. International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 2(1–4), 101–131. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.1978.tb00738.x
Ho, S., & Lin, G. (2003). Emerging land markets in rural and 
urban China: policies and practices. China Quarterly, 175, 
681–707. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741003000407
Hu, A. G. (1998). An arduous and difficult institutional inno-
vation: a preliminary assessment of the reform in the tax-
sharing system. The Chinese Economy, 31(4), 30–96. 
https://doi.org/10.2753/CES1097-1475310430
Hu, F., & Qian, J. (2017). Land-based finance, fiscal autonomy 
and land supply for affordable housing in urban China: a 
prefecture-level analysis. Land Use Policy, 69, 454–460. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.09.050
Huang, D., & Chan, R. C. (2018). On ‘Land Finance’ in urban 
China: theory and practice. Habitat International, 75, 96–104. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2018.03.002
Hyman, G., & Markowski, S. (1980). Speculation and inflation 
in the market for house-building land in England and Wales. 
Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 12(10), 
1119–1130. https://doi.org/10.1068/a121119
Lin, G.  C.  S., & Yi, F. (2011). Urbanization of capital or capi-
talization on urban land? Land development and local public 
finance in urbanizing China. Urban Geography, 32(1), 50–79. 
https://doi.org/10.2747/0272-3638.32.1.50
Liu, C., Moldogaziev, T. T., & Mikesell, J. L. (2017). Corruption 
and state and local government debt expansion. Public Ad-
ministration Review, 77(5), 681–690. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12711
Liu, T., Cao, G. Z., Yan, Y., & Raymond, Y. W. (2016). Urban land 
marketization in China: central policy, local initiative, and 
market mechanism. Land Use Policy, 57, 265–276. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.06.001
Liu, Y., Fan, P., Yue, W., & Song, Y. (2018). Impacts of land fi-
nance on urban sprawl in China: the case of Chongqing. Land 
Use Policy, 72, 420–432. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.01.004
Liu, Y. Z., & Zhao, J. M. (2011). Intergovernmental fiscal trans-
fers and local tax efforts: evidence from provinces in China. 
Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 14(4), 295–300. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870.2011.591175
Long, H. L., Li, Y. R., Liu, Y. S., Woods, M., & Zou, J. (2012). 
Accelerated restructuring in rural China fueled by’ increasing 
vs. decreasing balance’ land-use policy for dealing with hol-
lowed villages. Land Use Policy, 29(1), 11–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.04.003
Lu, Y., & Sun, T. (2013). Local government financing platforms 
in China: a fortune or misfortune? IMF Working Papers, 
13(243), 1–30. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475599671.001
Ma, J. (2013). Hidden fiscal risks in local China. Australian Jour-
nal of Public Administration, 72(3), 278–292. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.12028
Neutze, M. (1970). The price of land for urban development. The 
Economic Record, 46(3), 313–328. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.1970.tb02492.x
Pan, F., Zhang, F., & Zhu, S. (2017). Developing by borrowing? 
Inter-jurisdictional competition, land finance and local debt 
accumulation in China. Urban Studies, 54(4), 897–916. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098015624838
Peng, X. (2011). China’s demographic history and future chal-
lenges. Science, 333(6042), 581–587. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1209396
Rancich, M. T. (1970). Land value changes in an area undergoing 
urbanization. Land Economics, 46(1), 32–40. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3145421
Sun, X. L., & Zhou, F. Z. (2014). Land finance and the tax-sharing 
system: an empirical interpretation. Social Sciences in China, 
35(3), 47–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/02529203.2014.927094
Tanya, T., Phyllis, L. L. M., & Hung, K. (2017). Tax collector or 
tax avoider? An investigation of intergovernmental agency 
conflicts. The Accounting Review, 92(2), 247–270. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-51526
Tewfik, M. (1989). Urban land in Jordan: issues and policies. Cit-
ies, 6(2), 119–135. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0264-2751(89)90065-6
Tsui, K. Y. (2011). China’s infrastructure investment boom and 
local debt crisis. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 52(5), 
686–711. https://doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.52.5.686
Tu, L. H., & Padovani, E. (2018). A research on the debt sustain-
ability of China’s major city governments in post-land finance 
era. Sustainability, 10(5), 1606.
https://doi.org/10.3390/su10051606
Veiga, L. G., & Veiga, F. J. (2014). Determinants of Portuguese local 
governments’ indebtedness. NIPE Working Paper, 16, 10–20.
Wang, J., Lin, Y. F., Glendinning, A., & Xu, Y. Q. (2018). Land-
use changes and land policies evolution in China’s urbaniza-
tion processes. Land Use Policy, 75, 375–387. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.04.011
Wang, W., & Ye, F. (2016). The political economy of land finance 
in China. Public Budgeting & Finance, 36(2), 91–110. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12086
Wang, Y., & Hui, E. C. (2017). Are local governments maximizing 
land revenue? Evidence from China. China Economic Review, 
43, 196–215. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2017.02.005
Wen, H., Chu, L., Zhang, J., & Xiao, Y. (2018). Competitive in-
tensity, developer expectation, and land price: evidence from 
Hangzhou, China. Journal of Urban Planning and Develop-
ment, 144(4), 04018040. 
https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)UP.1943-5444.0000490
Wong, C. P. W. (2000). Central-local relations revisited: the 1994 tax 
sharing reform and public expenditure management in China, 
mimeo World Bank Office. China Perspectives, 31, 52–63.
Wu, G. L., Feng, Q., & Li, P. (2015a). Does local governments’ 
budget deficit push up housing prices in China? China Eco-
nomic Review, 35, 183–196. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2014.08.007
Wu, Q., Li, Y. L., & Yan, S. Q. (2015b). The incentives of China’s 
urban land finance. Land Use Policy, 42, 432–442. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.08.015
Wu, Y., Li, X., & Lin, G. (2016a). Reproducing the city of the 
spectacle: mega-events, local debts, and infrastructure-led 
urbanization in China. Cities, 53, 51–60. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2016.01.004
International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 25(1): 65–75 75
Wu, Y. Z., Luo, J. J., & Zhang, X. L., Skitmore, M. (2016b). Urban 
growth dilemmas and solutions in China: looking forward to 
2030. Habitat International, 56, 42–51. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2016.04.004
Wu, Y. Z., Mo, Z. B., & Peng, Y. (2017). Renewal of land-use term 
for urbanization in China: sword of Damocles or Noah’s Ark? 
Land Use Policy, 65, 238–248. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.04.018
Xu, N. N. (2019). What gave rise to China’s land finance? Land Use 
Policy, 87, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.05.034
Zhang, J., Fan, J., & Mo, J. (2017a). Government the interven-
tion, land market, and the urban development: evidence from 
Chinese cities. Economic Inquiry, 55(1), 115–136. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12353
Zhang, J., Zhang, D., Huang, L., Wen, H., Zhao, G., & Zhan, D. 
(2019a). Spatial distribution and influential factors of indus-
trial land productivity in China’s rapid urbanization. Journal 
of Cleaner Production, 234, 1287–1295. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.06.287
Zhang, J., Zhang, D., Zhao, G., Zeng, H., & Wen, H. (2019b). 
Land supply and urbanization strategy in the Yangtze River 
Delta region, China. Growth and Change, 50, 1338–1355. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/grow.12331
Zhang, X., Lin, Y., Wu, Y., & Skitmore, M. (2017b). Industrial 
land price between China’s Pearl River Delta and Southeast 
Asian regions: competition or coopetition? Land Use Policy, 
61, 575–586. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.12.011
Zheng, H., Wang, X., & Cao, S. (2014). The land finance model 
jeopardizes China’s sustainable development. Habitat Interna-
tional, 44, 130–136. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2014.05.008
